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Birch and Miss Minter that the indebtedness claimed did actually exist, and there is no evidence from which an inference
can be drawn that such indebtedness was fictitious or that
the representations made by defendant A. Otis Birch to plaintiff in relation thereto were false.
Of course, if the evidence is insufficient to establish the
fraud on the part of Mr. Birch, then Minter and Mrs. Birch
necessarily are not liable. But assuming it is sufficient, there
is a tot:>l lack of evidence to charge Minter and Mrs. Birch
with Mr. Birch's fraudulent representations. It is conceded
in the m:>jority opinion that neith~r l\Trs. Birch nor Minter
made any reprCstmtations to plaintiff, fraudulent or otherwise. In reg'urd to Mrs. Birch, there is no evidence that she
had any knowleclfte that the indehtedness to Minter was fictitious or that any representations were made by her husband
in connection therewith. The sole evidence in the record touching upon her connection with the transaction is that she knew
nothing about Birch's business transactions; and that she was
anxious to have the transaction settled. Surely, that is not
sufficient to support a judgment against her.
The basis stated in the majority opinion for holding Minter
liable as a conspirator is that she must have known that the
indebtedness between her and Birch was fictitious. She made
no representations, had no knowledge of any being made, or
of the settlement transaction between Birch and plaintiff.
ThfJre is no showing of any plan, or scheme, or agrevment between Birch, Minter and Mrs. Birch to engage in a conspiracy
to defraud plaintiff. It is essential to establish a conspiracy
that a common plan and dosign for concerted action be proved.
There is no evidence of such an agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the judgment
should be reversed.
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.

t·'·-·-··l~
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Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
1942.

Mar. 1942.]

BERNHARD

v.

BANK OF AMERICA.

[L. A. No. 18057. In Bank.

1507

Mar. 6, 1942.)

HELEN BERNHARD, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v.
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking Association), Respondent.
[1]

JudiSmonts - Res Judicata - Action on Di1Iorent Claim or
Cause.-The doctrine of res judicata, whereby any issue necessarily decided in litigation by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusively dcterrilincd ns to the p:trtics or their
privies if it is involv0d in !l subs011uent bw suit on a different
cause of action, is based upon thu public policy of limiting
litigation by preventing a party who h had one fair trial
on an issue from again drnwing' it into controversy, and serves
to protect persons from blling twice VexlJd for tho sllme cause.
rt must, however, conform to the mandate of due process of
law.
J

[2] rd.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Parties-Who Arc Partics-Privies.-Undor the requirement of
privity, frequently announced as essential to the availllbility
of a plea of res judicata, only parties to the former judgment or their privies may tllk(J advantage of or be bound by
it. A party in this connection is one who is "diroctly interested in the subject matter, nnd had a right to make defense,
or to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judgment." A privy is one who, Ilfter rendition of the judgment,
has acquired an intorest in the subject ma:ter affected by
the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase.
[3] rd. - Res Judicata - Action on Different Claim O~\ Cause _
Mutuality of Estoppel.-If muturJity of estoppel is requisite
to authorize relillnce on a plea of res judicata, the estoppel is
mutual if the one taking advantllge of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it, had it gone against him.
[4] n.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Par_
ties-Criteria.-The criteria for determining who m~y assert
[1] See 15 Cal. Jur. 97; 30 Am. Jur. 908.
[3] See 15 Cal. Jur. 190; 30 Am. Jur. 954.
Mcrr. r·J. References: [1, 5J Judgments, § 367; [2] Judgments,
§§ 415, 422, 429; [3J Judgments, § 369; [4] Judgments, § 415;
[6J Judgments, § 435.
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a .lIe", of res judicata differ fundamentally from the criteria
fo- determining against whom a plea may be asserted. While
the requirements of due process of law forbid the assertion
of such a plea against a party unless he was bound by the
earlier litigation in which the matter was decideJ, there is
no compelling reason for requiring that the party asserting
the plea must have been a party, or in privy with a party, to
the earlier litigation.
[5] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Oause or CIaim.-In
a determination of the validity of a plea of res judicata three
questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question' Was there a final judgment on the merits' Was
the party against whom the plea is asserteu a party or in
privy with a party to the prior adjudication? (Estate of
Smead, 219 Cal. 972 [28 Pac. (2d) 348]; Silva v. Hawkins,
152 Cal. 138 [92 Pac. 72J and People v. Rodgers, 118 Cal.
393 [43 Pac. 740, 50 Pac. 6eS], overruled in part.)
[6] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-Parties-Decedents, Personal Representatives.-In an action by
an administratrix against a bank for the amount of a bank
deposit, the bank is not precluded by the lack of privity or
mutuality of estoppel from urging as a former adjudication
the probate court's determination, when settling the account
of a former executor, that the decedent had made a gift to
him of the amount of the deposit where the plaintiff and
other ' ~gatees in the probate proceeding interposed, objec<,ions
to the account, and where the plaintiff, although suing in a
different capacity, is seeking a recovery for the benefit of
legatees and creditors, all of whom are bound by the order.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Myron Westover, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by administratrix to recover a bank deposit. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Joseph Brenner for Appellant.
Louis Ferrari, Edmund Nelson and G. L. Berrey for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In June, 1933, Mrs. Clara Sather, all
elderly woman, made her home with Mr. and Mrs. Charles
[6] See 12 Cal. Jur. 62; 15 Cal. Jur.117, 120, 189.
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O. Cook in San Dimas, California. Because of her failing
health, she authorized Mr. Cook and Dr. Joseph Zeiler to make
drafts jointly ngainst her commercial account in the Src;lrity
First National Bank of Los Angeles. On August 24:, In3,
Mr. Cook opened a commercial account at the First National
Bnnk of San Dimas in the name of "Clara Sather by CLurlc.:s
O. Cook." No authorization for this account was ever given
to the br.nkby Mrs. Sathor. Thereafter, 11 number of checks
dra'wn by Cook and Zeiler on Mrs. Sather's commercial :tecount in Los Angeles were deposited in the San Dimas :tecuunt alld checks were drawn upon that account ::iglled
"C1:1r:1 Sather by Charles O. Cook" to meet variol!.'3 expllnsesof Mrs. Sather.
011 October 26, 1933, a teller from the Los Angeles B:mk
caU(od on 1111'S. Sather at her request to assist in transferrh:g
hermonoy from thc Los Angeles Bank to the San Dim'ts Bank.
In the presence of this teller, the cashier of the S:m Dimas
Bank, 1Ifr. Cook, and her physician, Mrs. S:tther signed by
m:trk an authorization directing the Security First Natiol1al
n.']!!k of Los Angeles to transfer the balance of her saving'S
account in the amount of $4,155.68 to the First National BImk
of S'ln Dimas. She also signed an order for this amonnt on
the Security First National Bank of San Dimas "for credit
to the account of Mrs. Clara Sather. " The order was credited
hy the San Dimas Bank to the account of "Clara Sather by
Charleil O. Cook." Cook withdrew the entire balance from
that nccount:md opened a new account in the same bank in
the name of himself and his wife. He subsequently withdrew
the .funds from this last mentioned account an4 deposited
them in a Los Angeles Bank in the names of himself and his
wife.
Mrs. Sather died in November, 1933. Cook qualified as
executor of the estate and proceeded with its administration.
After a lapse of several years he filed an account at the instance of the probate court accompanied by his resienation.
The account made no mention of the money transferred by
Mrs. Sather to the San Dimas Bank; and Helen Bernhard,
Beaulah Bernhard, Hester Burton, and Iva LeDoux, beneficiaries under Mrs. Sather's will, filed objections to the account for this reason. After a hearing on the objections the
court settled the account, and as part of its order declared that
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the decedent during her lifetime had made a gift to Charles
O. Cook of the amount of the deposit in question.
After Cook's discharge, Helen Bernhard was appointed administratrix with the will annexed. She instituted this action
ag-ainst defrndant, the Bank of America, successor to the San
Dimas Bank, seeking to recover the deposit on the gro~md
that the hank was indebted to the estate for this amount because !lIrs. Sather never authorized its withdrawal. In addition to a general denial, defendant plraded two affirm:tth'e
dcf211ses: (1) that the money on deposit was paid out to
Charles O. Cook with the consent of Mrs. SathC>f and (2) that
this fact is res judicata by virtu{' of the finding of the probate
court in the proceeding to settle Cook's account that lHrs.
Sather made a gift of the money in question to Charles O.
Cook and "owned no sums of mone:}' what.soevrr" at the time
of her death. Plaintiff demurred to both th(,se defenses, and
objec·ted to the introduction in evidence of the record uf~the
earlier proceeding to support the plc>a of reS judiC':lta. She
also contended that the probate court had no juris,lictiun to
pass UPO:l'. Cook's ownership of the money because the E'xecutor reskned before the filing' of the objections. This last wntedion was answered before juilp.:ment was entered, by ihe
dcllision of this court in tv llterland v. Superior Court, 15 Cnl.
(2d) 34 [98 Pac. (2d) 211], holding that the probate court has
jurisdiction in such a situation. The trial court overruled the
demurrers and objection to the evidence, and gave judgment
for defendant on the ground that Cook's ownership of the
money was conclusively established by the finding of the probate court. Plaintiff has appealed, denying that the doctrine
of res jUdicata is applicable to the instant case or that there
was a valid gift of the money to Cook by Mrs. Sather.
Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of res jUdicata does not
apply because the defendant who is asserting the plea WtlS
not a party to the previous action nor in privity with a party
to that action and because there is no mutuality of estoppel.
[1] The doctrine of res jUdicata precludes parties or their
privies from relitigating a cause of action that hits b,~en
finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Any
issue necessarily decided in such litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties or their privies if it is involved in
a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action. (See cases
cited in 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.) sec. 627 i 2 Black,
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Judgments (2d ed.), sec. 504; 34 C. J. 742 et seq.; 15 Cal.
Jur. 97.) The rule is based upon the sound public policy of
limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had. one
fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controyersy.
(See cases cited in 38 Yale L. J. 299; 2 Freeman, Judgments
(5th ed.), sec. 626; 15 Cal. J ur. 98.) The doctrine also serves
to protect persons from being twice vexed for the same cause.
(lMd.) It must, however, conform to the mandate of due
process ,)f law that no person be deprived of personal or property ri7bts by a judgment without notice and an opportunity
to be heard. (Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124
[172 Atl. 260]. See eases cited in 24 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
(2d ed.), 731; 15 Cinn. L. Rev. 349, 351; 82 Pa. L. Rev.
871, 872.)
[2] Many courts have stated the facile formula that the
plea ,·f res judicata is availa~)le only when there is privity
and mutuality of estoppel. (See cases cited in2 Black, Judgmf'nts (2tl. ed.), secs. 534, 548, 549; 1 Freeman, Judgments
(5th ed.), sres. 407, 428; 35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J.
973, m:l8.) Under the requinment of privity, only parties
to the former judgment or their privies may take advantage
of or be bound by it. (Ibid.) A party in this connection is
one who is "directly interested in the subject matter, and
had a right to make defense, or to control the proceeding,
and to appeal from the judgment." (1 Greenleaf, Evidence
(15th cd.), sec. 523. See cases cited in 2 Black, Judg'ments
(2d ed.), sec. 534; 15 R. C. L. 1009*; 9 Va. L. Reg. (Ni.S.) 241,
242; 15 Cal. Jur. 190; 34 C. J. 992.) A privy is one who,
after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in
the suhject matter affected by the judgment through or under
one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase.
(See cases cited in 2 Black, Judgments (2d ed.), see. 549;
35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J. 973, 1010, 1012; 15 R. C. L.
1016.*) [3] The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it,
had it gone against him. (See cases cited in 2 Black, Judgments
(2d ed.), sec. 534, 548; 1 Freeman, JUdgments (5th ed.), sec.
428; 35 Yale L. J. 607, 608; 34 C. J. 988; 15 R. C. L. 956.*)
[4] The criteria for determining who may assert a plea
of res jUdicata differ fundamentally from the criteria for
*30 Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 219-246.
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determining against whom a plea of res judicata may be
asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the
assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless
he was bound by the earlier litigation in which the matter
was decided. (Coca Cola (Jo. v. Pepsi Cola Co" supra,. See
,cases cited in 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (2ded) 731; 15 Cinn.
L. Rev. 349, 351; 82 Pa. L. Rev. 871, 872.) He is bound by
that litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity
with a party thereto. (Ibid.) There is no compellillgreason,
however, for requiring that the party asserting the plea of
res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a
party, to the earlier litigation.
No satisf:tCtory rationalization has been advanced for the
rcquirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not
bound by a previous action should be precluded trom asserting it as res judicata 'against a party Who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehl'nd. (See 7 Bentham's Works (Bowring's ed.) 171.) Many courtsMvc abandoned the requiremeut of mutuality and confined the requirement of privity
to the party against whom the plea of res judicata is
asserted. (Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., supraj Liberty
Mutua~ Insur. Co. v. George Colon & Cd., 260 N. Y. 305 [183
N. E. 506] ; Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396; Eagle etc. Insur.
Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82 [140 S. E. 314, 57 .t\.. L. R. 490] ;
Jenkins v. AtllmticCoast Line R. Co., 89 S. C. 408 [71 S. E.
1010] ; United States v. Wexler, SFcd. (2d) 880. See Good
Health Dairy Food Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14
[9 N. E. (2d) 758, 112 A. L. R. 401].) The commentators
are almost unanimously in accord. (35 Yale L. J. 607; 9 Va.
L,. Reg'. (N. S.) 241 j 29 TIL L. Rev. 93 j 18 N; Y. U. L. Q.R.
565, 570 ;12 Corn. L. Q. 92.) The courts of most jurisdictions hll.ve in effect accomplished the same result by recognizing a broad exception to the requirements of mutuality
and privity, namely, that they a:re not necessary where the
liability of the defendant asserting the plea of res judicata
is dependent upon or derived' from the liability of one who
was exonerated in an earlier ::mit brought by the same plaintiff upon the same facts. (See 'cases cited i.n 35 Yale L; J.
607, 610; 9 Va. L. Reg. (N. S.) 241, 245~247; 29 Ill. L. Rev.
93, 94 j 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 565,566-567; 34 C. J. 988-989.)
Typical examples of such derivative liability are master and
servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee.
Thus, if a plaintiff sues a servant for injuries caused by the
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servant's alleged negligeuce within the scope of his employment, a judgment against the plaintiff on the grounds that
the servant Was not negligent can be pleaded by the master
as res jlldicata if he is subseqnently sued by the same plaintiff for the Sll.me injuries. Conversely, if the plaintiff first
sues the master, a judgment against the plnintiff on the
grounds that the servant was not negligent Clln be pleaded
, by the servant as res judicata if he is subsequently sued by
'the plaintiff. In each of these situations the party asserting
the plea of res judIcata was not a party to the previous action
nor in privity with such a party under the accepted definition
of a privy setforth above. Likewise, the estoppel is not mutual
since the party asserting the plea, not having been a party or
in privity with a party to the former action, would not have
been bound by it had it been decided the other way. The
cases justify this exception on the ground that it would be
unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen
ideuticalissues by merely switching adversaries.
[5] b determinin,g the validity ofa plea of res judicata
three questions are pertinent : Was the issue decided in the
prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action ill question? Was there a final judgment on the mcrits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or
I in privity with n party to the prior adjudication'
Estate of
Smead, 210 Cal. 572 [28 Pac. (2d) 348J; S~"lva IV. Hawkins,
152 Cal. 138 [92 Pac. 72], and People v. Rodgers, 118 Cal.
393 [46 Pac. 740, 50 Pac. 668], to the extent that they are
inconsistent with this opinion, are overruled.
[6] In the present case, therefore, the defendant is not
precluded by lack of privity Or of mutuality of estoppel from
assertinr, the plea of res judicata against the plaintiff. Since
the issue as to the ownership of the moneyis identical with
the issue raised in the probate proceeding, and sinee the order
of the probate eQurt settling the executor's account, was ,a
final adjudication of this issue on the merits (Prob. Code,
sec. 931 [formerly Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1637]; see cases
cited i1112 Cal. JUl'. 62, 63; 15 Cal. JUl'. 117, 120), it remains
, only to determine whether the plaintiff in the present action
was a party or in privity with a party to the earlier proceedin~. The plaintiff has bro~ght the present action in the capacity of administratrix of the estate. In this capacity she represents the very same persons and interests that were represented ill the earlier hearing on the executor ~s account. In
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that proceeding plaintiff and the other legatees who objected
to the executor's account represented the estate of the decedent. They were seeking not a personal recovery but, like the
plaintiff in the present action, as administratrix, a recovery
for the benefit of the legatees and creditors of the estate, all
of whom were bound by the order settling the account.
(Prob. Code, sec. 931. See cases cited in 12 Cal. JUl'. 62, 63.)
The plea of res judicata is therefore available against plaintiff as a party to the former proceeding, despite her formal
change of capacity. "Where a party though appcarin{; in
two suits in different capacities is in fact litigating the sar.Ie
right, the judgment in one estops him in the other." (15
Cal. Jur. 189; Williams v. Southern Pacific 00., 54 Cal. ~\.pp.
571 [202 Pac. 3561; Stevens v. Superior 001trt, 155 Cal. 148
[99 Pac. 512] ; Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331 [95 Pac. 3721·
See Ohicago, R. <17 I. R. R. 00. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 [46
S. Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 7571 ; Sunshine A. Coal 00. v. Adkins,
310 U. S. 381, 401 et seq. [60 S. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed. 12631 ;
Lee 00. v. Federal Trade Oom., 113 Fed. (2d) 583; and cases
cited in 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 158,159; 38 Yale L. J. 2~9, 310;
54 Harv. L. Rev. 890.)
The judgment is affirmea
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J.,
and Carter,' J., concurred.
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CONSOLIDATED MILK PRODUCERS FOR SAN FRANCISCO (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. WILLIAM B.
PARKER, as Director of Agriculture, etc., Respondent.
[1] Food-Milk-Milk Control Act-Sales on Federal Territory.The Director of Agriculture has no jurisdiction to establish
minimum prices for milk sold on territory over which the
United States has exclusive jurisdiction, the invitation for
bids being issued within, and the bids being filed and accepted
in such territory.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Director of
Agriculture to take proper proceedings against milk distributors which contracted to sell milk below established minimum prices. Writ denied.
Bartley C. Crum and Philip S. Ehrlich for Petitioner.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and W. R. Augustine,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Frank J. Hennessy, United States Attorney,ahd William
E. Licking, Assistant United States Attorney, as Amici
C1lriae, on behalf of Respondent.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1942.

TRAYNOR, J.-Three distributors of fluid milk licensed
to do business in the San Fl,'ancisco marketing area have contracted to sell fluid milk, at prices below those set by the
Director of Agriculture, to military agencies of the United
States in the Presidio. The Consolidated Milk Producers, an
association of milk producers for the San Francisco area,
requested the Director of Agriculture to take action to prevent. these sales. They also filed a verified complaint with the
director alleging that the sales violated the stabilization and
marketing plan for San Francisco and requested that a hear'ing be held to determine whether the licenses of the offending
distributors should be revoked. The director refused to take
action on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to fix the
[lJ· See 23 Cal. Jur. 527.
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1] Food, § 1.
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